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INTRODUCTION 
The Hole. Segregation. Isolation. Supermax. Lockdown. Special Housing Unit. 
Restrictive Housing Unit. These are terms used to describe the practice referred to in this 
Comment as solitary confinement, each evoking a slightly different idea of what it means 
to lock someone alone in a concrete or steel box for days, weeks, months, years, and 
sometimes decades on end. “The Hole” paints a grim picture of a dark and lonely place 
without a chance for escape. “Special Housing Unit” is vague, but ultimately puts a 
prettier gloss on the practice of extreme isolation. While each term may elicit slightly 
different feelings among those unfamiliar with what happens inside jail and prison walls, 
the horrific effects of prolonged and extreme isolation1 on persons with mental illness2 
are hauntingly consistent.  
The medical and scientific communities are in overwhelming agreement: 
prolonged solitary confinement has devastating effects on persons suffering from mental 
illness.3 Indeed, the practice has devastating effects on those who are not afflicted by 
mental illness. Why then, in a country as developed as the United States, is the practice of 
placing mentally ill prisoners in extreme and prolonged isolation so pervasive? The 
reasons are many, but this Comment focuses on the idea of “harm” and how the failure to 
treat psychological harm as seriously as physical harm erects barriers, which prevent 
mentally ill persons from getting relief from the torture of solitary confinement. 
Every year prisons throw people, many of whom suffer from debilitating mental 
illness, into the hole and never look back. According to the Eighth Amendment, 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”4 Prisoners attempting to challenge their solitary 
confinement via the Eighth Amendment must meet a two part test: (1) the conditions of 
confinement must be objectively serious or prisoners must allege they have a sufficiently 
serious medical need; and (2) prison officials must be deliberately indifferent to the harm, 
or potential future harm, caused by that condition or medical need.5 The failure to treat 
                                                 
1 For the sake of this Comment, “prolonged” solitary confinement refers to the practice of confining anyone 
in extreme isolation for a period longer than fifteen days. “Extreme isolation” refers to the denial of 
meaningful contact with other human beings and sensory deprivation that prisoners housed in solitary 
confinement experience between twenty-two and twenty-four hours per day.  
2 When it comes to prisoners suffering from mental illness, I use the broad definition from the Protection 
and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness (PAIMI) Act. Under the PAIMI Act, an “individual with 
mental illness” is an individual “who has a significant mental illness or emotional impairment, as 
determined by a mental health professional qualified under the laws and regulations of the State . . . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 10802(4)(A) (2012). “Significant mental illness” and “emotional impairment” are not further 
defined in the PAIMI Act or its implementing regulations. However, courts have generally favored a broad 
definition of these terms. See Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Hartford 
Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp.2d 649, 655 (D. Conn. 2005), aff'd, 464 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006); ANNA GUY, 
AVID PRISON PROJECT, LOCKED UP AND LOCKED DOWN: SEGREGATION OF INMATES WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS 5 n.5 (2016).  
3 See infra Part II.  
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
5 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825–26 (1970). Prisoners may also challenge their placement in solitary 
confinement through the Fourteenth Amendment, but this Comment focuses on the Eight Amendment. See, 
e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 476 (1995) (procedural due process challenge to solitary 
confinement). 
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psychological pain in the same manner as physical pain—for example, by determining 
prisoners are feigning mental illness or are malingering when they commit acts of self-
harm—has made it more difficult for prisoners suffering from mental illness to bring 
successful Eighth Amendment claims. 
Various provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) further serve to 
hinder successful challenges to solitary confinement. Under the Act, even if a prisoner 
with mental illness could otherwise bring a successful Eighth Amendment claim, he or 
she is sometimes barred from doing so by the three strikes provision.6 The three strikes 
provision of the PLRA requires prisoners who have filed three or more claims deemed 
frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim to prove an “imminent danger of serious 
physical injury” in order to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in federal court.7 This forces 
prisoners to advocate that their psychological pain and manifestations of mental illness 
constitute serious physical injury. Further, prisoner litigants alleging mental injury are 
barred from recovering compensatory damages, leaving limited avenues for relief and 
frustrating the ability of prisoners to retain counsel because of limitations on attorney fee 
awards.8 As this Comment will demonstrate, consensus in the scientific community 
suggests the distinction between serious psychological and physical harm is blurry at 
best. Therefore, a bright line cannot and should not be drawn. 
There is a strong argument, with growing support, that the practice of prolonged 
solitary confinement of any prisoner should be abolished as a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.9 While the movement to 
abolish solitary confinement is an important initiative, the scope of this Comment is 
limited to the argument that the practice of solitary confinement is categorically 
inappropriate for people suffering from mental illness. This argument is consistent with 
research that overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that placing a person with mental 
illness in solitary confinement causes consistent, and sometimes irreversible, 
psychological and physical harm.10 
This Comment analyzes the failure of the judiciary to treat psychological and 
physical harm with the same level of seriousness, which has precluded prisoners from 
making successful Eighth Amendment claims, especially “three strikes” prisoners. Part I 
provides a historical background and general overview of the conditions and the 
population of prisoners found in solitary confinement. Part II analyzes the physiological 
and psychological effects of solitary confinement on people with mental illness. Part III 
reveals that there is a blurred line between physical and psychological harm, and, 
therefore, argues that courts should treat them as similarly serious. Part IV outlines the 
legal framework in which challenges to solitary confinement operate and the legal 
consequences of treating psychological harm differently than physical harm. Ultimately, I 
                                                 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). 
7 § 1915(g). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)–(e) (2012). 
9 See Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and Far Too 
Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 745 (2015).  
10 See generally Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 
49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130 (2003) [hereinafter Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary 
Confinement]; Craig Haney, Restricting the Use of Solitary Confinement, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 285, 
299–301 (2018) [hereinafter Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement].  
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conclude that placing people who suffer from mental illness in solitary confinement 
cannot be squared with the Eighth Amendment. I also argue that, at minimum, the way in 
which courts treat physical harm as more serious than psychological harm must change to 
offer greater protection of prisoners’ right to humane conditions of confinement. 
I. WHAT IS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT? 
A. Brief History and Mounting Concern Over the Effects of Solitary Confinement 
The horrific reality of solitary confinement’s effects on human beings is well 
documented. Solitary confinement in the United States is traceable to the late seventeenth 
century when the Walnut Street Jail11 attempted to apply a new theory of punishment 
which placed the “worst type of felons” in solitary cells.12 The idea to experiment with 
solitary confinement stemmed from the Quaker belief that prisoners isolated in cells with 
only a Bible could use that time to reflect, repent, pray, and eventually reform.13 While 
the practice was a failure at Walnut Street, at least in part due to overcrowding,14 the 
Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia revived the practice in 1829.15 In 1842, Charles 
Dickens toured the Eastern State Penitentiary and wrote: 
 
In its intention, I am well convinced that it is kind, humane, and meant for 
reformation; but I am persuaded that those who devised this system of 
Prison Discipline, and those benevolent gentlemen who carry it into 
execution, do not know what they are doing. I believe that very few men 
are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and agony which 
this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers.16 
 
The practice was slowly abandoned in subsequent decades due to the number of prisoners 
who went insane, committed suicide, or were no longer able to function in society.17 By 
1890 the Supreme Court recognized the “serious objections” to extended solitary 
confinement, understanding the effects on prisoners were grave, including “violent 
insanity” and suicide, and that “in most cases [prisoners] did not recover sufficient mental 
activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.”18 
Today, concern about the effects of prolonged solitary confinement continues to 
grow. Activists and organizations against solitary confinement urge that the practice 
                                                 
11 Walnut Street Jail, located across the street from Independence Hall in Philadelphia, was Pennsylvania’s 
first penitentiary. LeRoy B. DePuy, The Walnut Street Prison: Pennsylvania’s First Penitentiary, 18 PA. 
HIST. 130, 130 (1951).  
12 Harry Elmer Barnes, Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
35, 48 (1921). 
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Laura Sullivan, Timeline: Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons, NPR (July 26, 2006, 7:52 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5579901. 
16 CHARLES DICKENS, Philadelphia, and Its Solitary Prison, in THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS: 
AMERICAN NOTES 96, 98 (1911). 
17 Sullivan, supra note 15. 
18 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). 
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amounts to torture and should be abolished.19 The concern is global—the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture specifically condemned solitary confinement as torture and urged 
an absolute prohibition on the practice in excess of fifteen days.20 Former Justice 
Kennedy, concurring in Davis v. Ayala, asserted that research describing the side-effects 
of solitary confinement—anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and 
suicidal thoughts and behaviors—confirmed “what [the Supreme] Court suggested over a 
century ago: Years on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”21 Following 
former Justice Kennedy’s lead, Justice Breyer, writing in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 
referenced peer-reviewed material documenting that “prolonged solitary confinement 
produces numerous deleterious harms,” both physical and psychological.22 Most recently, 
Justice Sotomayor wrote of the well-known harms of solitary, urging courts and 
corrections officials to “remain alert to the clear constitutional problems raised by 
keeping prisoners in solitary confinement,” and describing solitary as a “penal tomb.”23 
Although concern is mounting, this concern, absent concrete and meaningful action, 
means little for those suffering from mental illness trapped in solitary confinement across 
the country. 
B. “Typical” Conditions of Confinement 
Solitary confinement refers to “the housing of an adult or juvenile with minimal 
to rare meaningful contact with other individuals.”24 The actual conditions of solitary 
confinement vary by institution. However, every solitary confinement regime maintains 
certain consistent features—small spaces, minimal and meaningless human interaction, 
and overexposure to negative stimuli such as noxious smells from feces, urine and blood; 
loud banging; and the screaming and echoing of other prisoners in solitary.25 
                                                 
19 See generally SCARLET KIM ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN: THE TRUE COST OF 
EXTREME ISOLATION IN NEW YORK’S PRISONS (2012), 
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/nyclu_boxedin_FINAL.pdf; Stop Solitary: No Time 
to Lose, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights/solitary-confinement/we-can-stop-
solitary?redirect=stop-solitary-dangerous-overuse-solitary-confinement-united-states-0 (last visited Feb. 
10, 2018); Stop Torture Campaign, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/stop-torture/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018); Torture in U.S. Prisons, NAT’L RELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST TORTURE, 
http://www.nrcat.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); N.Y. CAMPAIGN FOR ALTERNATIVES TO ISOLATED 
CONFINEMENT, http://nycaic.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  
20 U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
23, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (August 5, 2011), available at: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/268. 
21 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325 (2006)).                                                       
22 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015). 
23 Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 10 (2018). 
24 Solitary Confinement (Isolation): Definition, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 
http://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement (last visited Nov. 18, 2017). 
25 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment Analysis of 
Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. L. REV. 1, 
39 n.217 (2012); Nathaniel Penn, Buried Alive: Stories From Inside Solitary Confinement, GQ (Mar. 2, 
2017), https://www.gq.com/story/buried-alive-solitary-confinement. 
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Solitary confinement cells are typically designed to isolate prisoners from 
virtually all human contact.26 Prisoners are confined to their cells with almost nothing to 
occupy their time between twenty-two and twenty-four hours a day.27 Cells generally 
range in size from sixty to eighty square feet—about the size of a parking space—and 
many do not have windows.28 Prison staff serve meals through a slot or “chuck hole” in 
the door to minimize human interaction.29 The few opportunities prisoners have outside 
of their cells do not offer the opportunity for meaningful human interaction or exposure 
to environmental stimuli.30 Further, to take advantage of these few opportunities outside 
of their cell, many prisoners must submit to an invasive cavity strip-search—every single 
time these prisoners exit their cell, they are strip-searched.31 Sometimes prisoners are 
escorted from their cell for an hour of exercise, usually only on weekdays, if at all, in a 
fenced or walled yard segregated from other prisoners.32 Other institutions have exercise 
“cages” adjoining the cells that can be opened remotely by prison staff.33 Some prisoners 
in solitary may be allowed to have visitors, but generally may only communicate through 
a Plexiglas barrier to prevent any physical contact.34 Most prisons allow some books and 
legal papers in the cell, and some permit prisoners to send and receive letters, but often 
with restrictions.35 Some prisons also allow for the cells to have radios or televisions.36 
Finally, solitary confinement units overexpose prisoners to negative stimuli, including 
officers and prisoners shouting, slamming doors, foul smells and sights such as urine, 
feces, blood, garbage, and constant fluorescent lighting.37 The period of time that 
prisoners are kept in such extreme isolation and in these grim conditions ranges from 
days to decades.38 
 
 
                                                 
26 Jean Casella & Sal Rodriguez, What Is Solitary Confinement?, GUARDIAN (N.Y.) (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/27/what-is-solitary-confinement. 
27 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213–14, 223–24 (2005); Haney, Restricting Solitary 
Confinement, supra note 10, at 304. 
28 Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 127. 
29 David H. Cloud et al., Public Health and Solitary Confinement in the United States, 105 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 18, 20 (2015). 
30 Peter Scharf Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review 
of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 448–49 (2006). 
31 See e.g., Lewis Beale, The Agony of Solitary Confinement: It’s Like Being ‘Buried Alive,’ Prisoners Say, 
DAILY BEAST (April 13, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-agony-of-solitary-confinement-its-like-
being-buried-alive-prisoners-say; Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law; Mark Joseph Stern, Solitary 
Confinement Is a Great American Shame, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2017/02/the-time-is-right-for-the-supreme-court-to-rein-in-solitary-confinement.html. 
32 HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FROM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 7 (Jean Casella et al. eds., 2016). 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Cloud et al., supra note 29, at 22; Hafemeister & George, supra note 25, at 39 n.217. 
38 Casella & Rodriguez, supra note 26. 
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C. Who is Kept in Solitary Confinement? 
People with mental illness are dramatically overrepresented in United States 
prisons and jails.39 In the wake of deinstitutionalization,40 prisons and jails have become 
the nation’s largest inpatient psychiatric centers.41 In 2012, the Treatment Advocacy 
Center estimated that more than 350,000 people with a serious mental illness were 
housed in prisons and jails, while a tenth of this population (about 35,000) were in state 
mental hospitals.42 Many people suffering from mental illness find their way into prisons 
on relatively minor charges; however, once incarcerated, they rack up additional charges 
“as they act out because of untreated illness, and end up spending a lifetime of cycling in 
and out of jail.”43 
The number of people held in solitary confinement in the United States is difficult 
to determine.44 Estimates suggest that between 80,000 to 100,000 people in U.S. prisons 
were held in restrictive housing in 2014,45 which does not include people held in local 
jails, juvenile facilities, or military and immigration detention centers.46 Human Rights 
Watch estimated, based on available state data, that one-third to one-half of people held 
in isolation had some form of mental illness.47 Even under conservative estimates, 
solitary confinement cells are used to warehouse tens of thousands of people with mental 
illness.48 
It is not surprising that those with mental illness are disproportionally confined to 
solitary confinement. Once in prison, many prisoners suffering from mental illness have 
difficulty conforming their conduct to the many disciplinary rules and to the restrictive 
prison environment.49 Additionally, the decision to send prisoners to solitary confinement 
                                                 
39 Rebecca Vallas, Disabled Behind Bars: The Mass Incarceration of People with Disabilities in America’s 
Jails and Prisons, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 18, 2016, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/07/18/141447/disabled-behind-
bars/. 
40 Dae-Young Kim, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization and Prison Population Growth: A Critical Literature 
Review and Its Implications, 27 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 3, 6 (2016) (explaining that deinstitutionalization 
is the “process of shifting mental health care for the mentally ill to community-based outpatient facilities, 
thereby reducing the population of state mental hospitals”). 
41 Id. at 8. 
42 E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 6 (2014), 
http://tacreports.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-bars.pdf. 
43 HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE, supra note 32, at 9. 
44 Valerie Kiebala & Sal Rodriguez, FAQ, SOLITARY WATCH (2018), https://solitarywatch.org/facts/faq/.  
45 Restrictive housing includes administrative segregation, disciplinary segregation, and protective custody, 
all of which are forms of solitary confinement. ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-
CELL: THE ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 1–2 
(2015). 
46 Id. at 2. 
47 SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND 
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 147 (2003).  
48 Id. 
49 Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A 
Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 105 (2010). 
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is left to the discretion of the prison staff and is open to abuse.50 Prisoners are often sent 
to solitary confinement for acts like attempting suicide, failing to obey an order properly, 
or even “reckless eyeballing.”51 Consequently, many prisoners with pre-existing mental 
health conditions find their way into solitary because of behavior associated with their 
mental illness.52 Once in solitary, the extreme isolation serves to exacerbate mental health 
issues, or even bring them out in prisoners who never exhibited them before.53 
People with mental illness may also find themselves in solitary confinement for 
non-disciplinary reasons.54 Protective custody, which often includes solitary 
confinement-like conditions, theoretically exists to shield vulnerable populations from 
abuse in general-population settings.55 While separation from the general-population may 
be necessary to protect some vulnerable prisoners, it does not justify placement in solitary 
confinement. The National Prison Rape Elimination Act Resource Center (NPRC)56 
issued a report in 2015 that found “[i]nmates with serious mental illness are among the 
populations who are often placed in segregated housing for protection . . . in units with 
the same intensive security procedures, levels of isolation, restricted human interactions, 
and reduced access to programs” despite having no disciplinary violations or threats to 
staff or others.57  
The overrepresentation of prisoners with serious mental illness in solitary 
confinement should concern courts, legislators, and the general public alike. Solitary 
confinement is, by design, a particularly cruel form of punishment—the withholding of 
all meaningful human contact and positive environmental stimuli is beyond what most 
people can comprehend. As the next Part shows, prisoners with mental illness are at a 
heightened risk of succumbing to the well-documented psychological and physical harms 
of being confined in such a manner.  
 
 
                                                 
50 Keramet Reiter, Supermax Administration and the Eighth Amendment: Deference, Discretion, and 
Double Bunking, 1986–2010, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 89, 91 (2015). 
51 See Annalisa Merelli, These Are Some of the Reasons U.S. Prisoners Wind Up in Solitary Confinement, 
QUARTZ (Aug. 15, 2015), https://qz.com/480015/these-are-some-of-the-reasons-us-prisoners-wind-up-in-
solitary-confinement; Nicholas D. Mirzoeff, ‘Reckless Eyeballing’: Why Freddie Gray Was Killed, HOW TO 
SEE THE WORLD (May 20, 2015), https://wp.nyu.edu/howtoseetheworld/2015/05/30/auto-draft-46/ (“Under 
slavery, [‘reckless eyeballing’] meant making any eye contact with a person in authority. Under 
segregation, it referred to any alleged look at a white woman, part of Jim Crow’s terror. Today, it is a tool 
of the prison-industrial complex, where ‘don’t eyeball me’ is a standard command.”). 
52 ACLU OF NEV. ET AL., UNLOCKING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: ENDING EXTREME ISOLATION IN NEVADA 
STATE PRISONS 24 (2017). 
53 Id.  
54 ALLISON HASTINGS ET AL., NAT’L PREA RES. CTR., KEEPING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS SAFE UNDER 
PREA: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TO THE USE OF SEGREGATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS 5 (2015). 
55 Kenneth L. Appelbaum, American Psychiatry Should Join the Call to Abolish Solitary Confinement, 43 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 406, 408 (2015). 
56 The NPRC (National PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) Resource Center), “a joint project of the 
federal Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, issued a report in 
April 2015.” Id. at 407. 
57 HASTINGS ET AL., supra note 54, at 5. 
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II. EFFECTS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 
The effects of solitary confinement have been recognized by the courts for over a 
century.58 Moreover, it is well established among the scientific and medical communities 
that placing persons suffering from mental illness in solitary confinement exacerbates 
their illness, typically resulting in serious psychological and physiological harm.59 Social 
relationships play a crucial role in maintaining the well-being and health of humans.60 
Since at least the 1970s, an extensive body of research has repeatedly shown the adverse 
psychological and physiological effects, including increased mortality, of social isolation 
outside of correctional settings.61 There is no reason to believe prisoners are immune 
from these effects.  
A. Prolonged Solitary Confinement for Mentally Ill Prisoners Causes Serious 
Psychological Harm 
“Solitary confinement literally drives men mad,” former Justice Kennedy told the 
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and Federal Government in 
2015.62 Indeed, prolonged solitary confinement “may press the outer bounds of what 
most humans can psychologically tolerate.”63 The toll solitary confinement takes on 
mental health is well documented, with research consistently and unequivocally 
establishing that solitary confinement causes serious psychological harm.64 
 Strikingly consistent psychiatric symptoms among prisoners in isolation include: 
overwhelming anxiety and depression; hypersensitivity to external stimuli; perceptual 
distortions, illusions, and hallucinations; severe panic attacks; difficulty in thinking, 
concentration, and memory; intrusive obsessional (and often violent) thoughts that 
prisoners resist but cannot block out; overt paranoia; and problems with impulse 
                                                 
58 See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890) (recognizing the serious objections to prolonged solitary 
confinement, the Court wrote that the effects on prisoners were grave, including violent insanity and 
suicide). 
59 Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 130. There is one 
controversial study released in 2010, known as the “Colorado Study,” that came to a different conclusion; 
however, it is widely criticized for its methodology, with two prominent scholars in the field addressing the 
“fatal flaws” of the study extensively. MAUREEN L. O’KEEFE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ONE YEAR 
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION 78 (2010); see 
also Stuart Grassian & Terry Kupers, The Colorado Study vs. The Reality of Supermax Confinement, 13 
CORR. MENTAL HEALTH REP. 1, 6–11 (2011) (debunking the Colorado Study and revealing its fatal flaws). 
60 Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 296–97; James S. House et al., Social 
Relationships and Health, 241 SCI. 540, 540–45 (1988). 
61 See, e.g., Bennion, supra note 9, at 757–59; Paul Gendreau et al., Changes in EEG Alpha Frequency and 
Evoked Response Latency During Solitary Confinement, 79 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 54, 54 (1972); Haney, 
Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 130–32; Haney, Restricting 
Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 288–95; G.D. Scott & Paul Gendreau, Psychiatric Implications of 
Sensory Deprivation in a Maximum Security Prison, 14 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY  337, 339 (1969).  
62 Jean Casella, Supreme Court Justice Kennedy: “Solitary Confinement Literally Drives Men Mad,” 
SOLITARY WATCH (Mar. 25, 2015), http://solitarywatch.com/2015/03/25/supreme-court-justice-kennedy-
corrections-system-is-broken-and-solitary-confinement-literally-drives-men-mad/. 
63 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
64 Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 298. 
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control.65 Furthermore, studies show that without normal and positive environmental 
interactions, including exposure to natural light, outdoor sounds, and varying colors, 
certain cognitive functions go underutilized, resulting in a decrease of mental alertness, 
concentration, and the ability to plan.66 
While it is abundantly clear that solitary confinement can take a serious mental 
toll on any prisoner, prisoners with mental illnesses are at greater risk of having their 
suffering “deepen into something more permanent and disabling.”67 Psychologist Craig 
Haney notes: 
 
Empirical research on solitary and supermax-like confinement has 
consistently and unequivocally documented the harmful consequences of 
living in these kinds of environments . . . . Evidence of these negative 
psychological effects come from person accounts, descriptive studies, and 
systemic research . . . conducted over a period of four decades, by 
researchers from several different continents.68 
 
Some lower courts have recognized that severe psychological harm results from 
placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement.69 Indiana Protection & Advocacy 
Services Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction highlighted 
the very real nature of psychological pain caused by decompensation (an exacerbation of 
mental illness).70 The court described psychological pain as “pain and suffering 
associated with feeling depressed, anxious, having nightmares, memory problems, 
worries, and anxieties,” asserting that “[p]sychological pain exists. It is real and it results 
from many of the symptoms which are associated with the mentally ill.”71 The court 
explained that psychological “pain produces suffering, and a delay in treating [it] can 
reduce the chances of a mentally ill prisoner achieving or re-establishing an optimal level 
of functioning.”72 
In Madrid v. Gomez, the District Court for the Northern District of California 
wrote that solitary confinement “may press the outer borders of what most humans can 
psychologically tolerate” and that placing mentally ill or psychologically vulnerable 
people in such conditions “is the equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little 
air to breathe.”73 However, the court also found that, although solitary confinement “will 
                                                 
65 Id. at 295; Grassian, supra note 21, at 335–38. 
66 Scott & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 337–39. Although these studies focus on social isolation outside of 
correctional settings, there is no reason to believe that prisoners are immune from such effects. 
67 Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 142. 
68 Id. at 130.  
69 See, e.g., Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 233 (3d Cir. 2017); Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 977 
(7th Cir. 2006); Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101–02 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 
F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Ruiz v. United States, 37 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001). 
70 No. 1:08-cv-01317, 2012 WL 6738517, at *15–16 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012). 
71 Id. at *16, *21. 
72 Id. at *16. 
73 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Finely v. Huss, 723 F. App’x. 294 (2018) 
(finding a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim where prison officials placed in solitary a seriously 
mentally ill prisoner who had swallowed a razor blade and engaged in behavior that required 
hospitalization more than once); Coleman v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1095 (E.D. Cal. 2014) 
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likely inflict some degree of psychological trauma upon most prisoners confined there for 
more than brief periods,” for many of the prisoners the trauma does not appear to 
“exceed[] the kind of generalized psychological pain that courts have found compatible 
with the Eighth Amendment standards.”74 
Even corrections officials have recognized the serious problems with placing 
persons with mental illness in solitary confinement. In 2014, Rick Raemisch, Colorado’s 
Chief of Corrections, decided to spend a night in one of Colorado’s solitary confinement 
cells.75 Raemisch described his experience: 
 
First thing you notice is that it’s anything but quiet. You’re immersed in a 
drone of garbled noise—other inmates’ blaring TVs, distant conversations, 
shouted arguments. I couldn’t make sense of any of it, and was left feeling 
twitchy and paranoid. I kept waiting for the lights to turn off, to signal the 
end of the day. But the lights did not shut off. I began to count the small 
holes carved in the walls. Tiny grooves made by inmates who’d chipped 
away at the cell as the cell chipped away at them. For a sound mind, those 
are daunting circumstances. But every prison in America has become a 
dumping ground for the mentally ill.76  
 
The experiment prompted an “urgency for reform,” with Mr. Raemisch explaining that 
“[i]f we can’t eliminate solitary confinement, at least we can strive greatly to reduce its 
use” and that “doing anything less would be both counterproductive and inhumane.”77 
Although severe psychological pain is not always recognized as sufficiently 
serious to bring an Eighth Amendment claim, it is widely recognized as a side-effect of 
prolonged solitary confinement and is exacerbated in people suffering from mental 
illness.78 
B. Isolating Mentally Ill Prisoners in Prolonged Solitary Confinement Can Cause 
Serious Physical Harm 
The risk of serious physical harm faced by prisoners with mental illness in 
solitary confinement is also well established. One scholar explained that: 
[a]s a result of . . . [mental illness], such individuals are almost 
pathologically stimulation seeking and incapable of tolerating stimulus 
deprivation . . . . Many become floridly psychotic or so agitated that they 
                                                                                                                                                 
(concluding that the “placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in California’s segregated housing units 
can and does cause serious psychological harm, including decompensation, exacerbation of mental illness, 
inducement of psychosis, and increased risk of suicide”); Ruiz, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 907 (describing Texas 
administrative segregation as “incubators of psychoses—seeding illness in otherwise healthy inmates and 
exacerbating illness in those already suffering from mental infirmities”). 
74 Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1265.  
75 Rick Raemisch, My Night in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/opinion/my-night-in-solitary.html. 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Hafemeister & George, supra note 25, at 26–29. 
Vol. 14:1]                                                                                                     Rosalind Dillon                            
 277 
engage in awful, grotesque behaviors. They cover themselves and their 
cells with feces, they mutilate themselves; try to kill themselves.79  
In Scarver v. Litscher, the court explained “[i]t is a fair inference that conditions at 
Supermax aggravated the symptoms of [the prisoner’s] mental illness and by doing so 
inflicted severe physical and especially mental suffering.”80 Physical harm can occur with 
severity alongside psychological harm where a prisoner is exposed to prolonged solitary 
confinement. 
1. Suicide and Self-Harm 
Self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide are horrifically common in solitary 
confinement units. In Palakovic v. Wetzel, the court recognized this, writing that the 
damage to prisoners is not restricted to mental harm, but that “[p]hysical harm can also 
result. Studies have documented high rates of suicide and self-mutilation amongst 
inmates who have been subjected to solitary confinement.”81 
Many prison suicides and attempted suicides are directly the result of serious 
mental illness.82 On average, about half of successful suicides by prisoners occur among 
those housed in solitary confinement.83 And the ways prisoners die in solitary are 
gruesome. One prisoner recounts watching through the crack of his cell door an older 
man in solitary slit his wrists, fill a Styrofoam cup with the blood, then fling his blood on 
the glass of his cell door and around his room before he laid down and died.84 Another 
prisoner “stood on top of the cement bunk and dove headfirst into the toilet, over and 
over, until he crushed his skull in.”85 The amount of self-harm, such as “cutting” or 
swallowing dangerous objects, is similarly horrific.86  
                                                 
79 Id. at 42 (internal citation omitted). 
80 434 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 
1101–02 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (concluding that supermax confinement is “known to cause severe psychiatric 
morbidity, disability, suffering and mortality,” resulting in a high number of suicide attempts). 
81 854 F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Williams v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 
567–68 (3d Cir. 2017)); see also Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (referencing a DOJ 
report finding that “the use of solitary confinement on mentally ill prisoners exacerbates their mental illness 
and leads to serious psychological and physiological harms,” “including psychosis, trauma, and severe 
depression, serious self-injury, and suicide”) (internal quotation omitted); Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 
1171, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (“By subjecting mentally ill prisoners to its segregation practices, [the DOC] 
has placed prisoners with serious mental-health needs at a substantial risk of continued pain and suffering, 
decompensation, self-injurious behavior, and even death, and the court cannot close its eyes to this 
overwhelming evidence.”). 
82 See TERRY ALLEN KUPERS, SOLITARY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SUPERMAX ISOLATION AND HOW WE CAN 
ABOLISH IT 102 (2017); Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 290, 294; see also 
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (alleging that prison officials’ failure to 
medicate mentally ill prisoner resulted in prisoner’s suicide); Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(affirming injunction based on findings that state prison’s policies for the treatment of mentally ill prisoners 
were insufficient for prisoners’ protection). 
83 Grassian & Kupers, supra note 59, at 1. 
84 Penn, supra note 25. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.; Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 294. 
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A significant problem is that far too often the actions of mentally ill prisoners are 
assumed to be volitional by corrections staff and courts alike. Some correctional mental 
health staff are quick to see a prisoner’s actions as malingering or manipulation and thus 
overlook mental illness.87 A prisoner housed at Tamms Correctional Center in Illinois 
before it was closed cut one of his testicles from his body and hung it from a string on his 
cell door.88 Rather than determining the prisoner was suffering from mental illness and 
should be removed from solitary confinement, medical and staff members at the 
institution labeled the prisoner a “manipulator who cuts himself to get what he wants.”89 
More commonly, these self-harm acts are not voluntary at all. The so-called 
“manipulation” prisoners accused of exhibiting in solitary confinement, such as self-
mutilation, is not inconsistent with mental illness.90 There are countless stories of isolated 
prisoners with mental illness inflicting self-harm to escape their cell, even if just for a trip 
to medical.91 However, the behavior “can also — and simultaneously — be a symptom of 
a major psychiatric disorder or a self-reinforcing behavior that requires a psychiatric 
response.”92 
The Seventh Circuit case Sanders v. Melvin, decided in October 2017, expressly 
recognized that the determination that volitional harm cannot satisfy the “imminent risk 
danger of serious . . . injury” standard associated with three strikes litigation is 
inappropriate.93 In the case, Sanders suffered from severe mental illness and had been 
kept in solitary for eight consecutive years, during which time he committed several acts 
of self-harm and attempted suicide.94 The court found that the district court incorrectly 
assumed that volitional harm cannot satisfy the statute, writing: “[I]t does not follow that 
no volitional conduct satisfies the statute . . . . When the prospect of self-harm is a true 
consequence of the condition that prompted the suit, a court should treat the allegation (if 
true) as imminent physical injury.”95 
These anecdotes and court decisions demonstrate the risk of physical harm 
prisoners in isolation face in the form of suicide, suicidality, and self-harm. These risks 
cannot be overstated and should be treated seriously by courts.   
                                                 
87 ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 47, at 106; Christine Rebman, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary 
Confinement: The Gap in Protection from Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 618 
n.441 (1999). 
88 Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Illinois Prisoner Says Years of Solitary Confinement Caused Mental 
Illness, Self-Mutilation, SOLITARY WATCH (Sept. 2, 2011), http://solitarywatch.com/2011/09/02/illinois-
inmate-claims-years-of-solitary-confinement-have-led-to-mental-illness-and-self-mutilation/. 
89 Id.  
90 ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 47, at 106.  
91 See, e.g., id. at 145 (An evaluation of one prisoner demonstrated that he “insert[s] paper clips completely 
into his abdomen—to relieve his anxiety and to be removed from his cell for medical treatment.”); id. at 
174 (“[A] seriously mentally ill inmate in a super-maximum security prison was caught eating his own 
flesh after having cut open his arm with a shard of glass. He was brought before a disciplinary committee, 
and was sentenced to a year in the prison’s segregation cells.”); Rebman, supra note 87, at 573–74 (“[O]ne 
inmate ‘removed a screw from his light switch cover and inserted it into his penis just to get out of his 
cell.’”) (citation omitted). 
92 ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 47, at 106. 
93 873 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2017).  
94 Id. at 960. 
95 Id. at 961. 
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2. Other Kinds of Physical Harm Suffered in Solitary Confinement 
Many prisoners placed in solitary confinement, both prisoners living with mental 
illness and those who do not suffer from mental illness, experience forms of physical 
harm independent from self-harm and suicide. Among the most common physical 
manifestations of extreme isolation include severe headaches, heart palpitations, 
insomnia, extreme weight loss, and digestive problems.96 Other physiological 
manifestations include abdominal pain and muscle pains in the neck and back, as well as 
pain and pressure in the chest.97 Some of these physical manifestations are a result of the 
“stress hormone” cortisol, which builds up in the body during extreme isolation.98  
Additionally, there are theories that neural pathways in the brains of people 
subjected to isolation physically change. Advances in technology, neurobiology, brain 
chemistry, and other studies of the brain have established that the harms associated with 
solitary confinement also tend to trigger detectable changes in neural pathways of the 
brain.99 These changes can be accurately characterized as physical injury because they 
adversely affect the physical nature and functioning of the sufferer’s brain. 
Given the deprivation of meaningful social interaction, coupled with a severe lack 
of environmental stimulation, people “become incapable of maintaining an adequate state 
of alertness and attention,” and within days, scans of their brains may reflect “abnormal 
pattern[s] characteristic of stupor and delirium.”100 Although such manifestations sound 
like mental harm, the fact that these harms can be detected by brain scans implicate a 
physiological harm. A growing body of literature shows that solitary confinement can 
change brain activity, resulting in adverse symptoms, sometimes in as few as seven 
days.101 Other studies show that “certain regions of the brain of people who experience 
extreme psychological stress (like those in solitary confinement) literally diminish in 
volume because the neural cells become shriveled.”102 
More research still suggests that the different pathways for physical and 
psychological pain share neural and computational mechanisms.103 Studies have shown 
that higher levels of social support—something prisoners trapped in solitary confinement 
                                                 
96 Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 131–33; Smith, 
supra note 30, at 488–89. 
97 Smith, supra note 30, at 489. 
98 See infra Part III for a more complete discussion of cortisol, including how the cortisol response causes 
neither clear physical or psychological harm. 
99 See Jules Lobel & Huda Akil, Law & Neuroscience: The Case of Solitary Confinement, 147 DAEDALUS 
61, 63 (2018); Carol Schaeffer, “Isolation Devastates the Brain”: The Neuroscience of Solitary 
Confinement, SOLITARY WATCH (May 11, 2016), https://solitarywatch.org/2016/05/11/isolation-devastates-
the-brain-the-neuroscience-of-solitary-confinement/; see also Gendreau et al. supra note 61, at 340; Bruce 
S. McEwen, The Neurobiology of Stress: From Serendipity to Clinical Relevance, 886 BRAIN RES. 172, 173 
(2000). 
100 Grassian, supra note 21, at 330–31. 
101 Gendreau et al., supra note 61, at 57–58; Grassian, supra note 21, at 348–49; Lobel & Akil, supra note 
99, at 62, 69–70; Schaeffer, supra note 99. 
102 Lobel & Akil, supra note 99, at 70 (citation omitted). See infra Part III for a continuation of the 
discussion on physical brain changes and the associated harms, which are neither strictly physical or 
psychological in nature. 
103 Naomi I. Eisenberger & Matthew D. Lieberman, Why Rejection Hurts: A Common Neural Alarm System 
for Physical and Social Pain, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 294, 294 (2004). 
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are almost completely lacking—“are associated with lower levels of chronic pain . . . 
[and] cardiac pain . . . In addition, people who are socially alienated are more prone to 
physical ailments.”104 The conclusion is that “the social pain caused by isolation is not 
metaphorical pain, but has a physical effect on brain activity.”105 Although this research 
has largely taken place outside of a correctional setting, it nonetheless suggests the line 
between physical and psychological pain is not clear, and that the social isolation may be 
just as “painful” as physical pain. 
There can be no question that solitary confinement places prisoners at enormous 
risk of suffering serious psychological and physiological harms. Worse still, prisoners 
with mental illness, who are already overrepresented in solitary, are at a greater risk to 
these deleterious harms, which can be permanent. Part III demonstrates that the 
psychological and physiological horrors of solitary are often linked, and therefore there 
can be no bright line drawn between the two.  
III. BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM 
There is a growing consensus among the psychology and psychiatry communities 
that the distinction between psychological and physical harm is no longer accurate or 
appropriate.106 Senator John McCain, who spent more than two years in isolation as a 
prisoner of war in Vietnam, said that solitary is the worst form of mistreatment.107 This 
assertion comes “from a man who was beaten regularly; denied adequate medical 
treatment for two broken arms, a broken leg, and chronic dysentery; and tortured to the 
point of having an arm broken again.”108 A study of several former prisoners of the 
Vietnam War reported that they all found social isolation to be at least as torturous and 
agonizing as any physical abuse they experienced, possibly more agonizing.109 
Research suggests that drawing a hard line between physical and psychological 
pain is inappropriate in part because psychological harm can be just as painful, if not 
more painful, than physical abuse.110 Perhaps this is why solitary confinement is so 
commonly used for the specific purpose of torture. Studies have found that 
“psychological stressors such as isolation can be as clinically distressing as physical 
torture.”111 Many of the adverse effects of prolonged solitary confinement are strikingly 
similar “to the acute reactions suffered by torture and trauma victims, including post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the kind of psychiatric sequelae that plague victims 
of what are called deprivation and constraint torture techniques.”112 
                                                 
104 Geoff MacDonald & Mark R. Leary, Why Does Social Exclusion Hurt? The Relationship Between 
Social and Physical Pain, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 202, 207 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
105 Lobel & Akil, supra note 99, at 69. 
106 See Metin Basoglu et al., Torture vs. Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 64 ARCHIVES 
GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 277, 285 (2007); Lobel & Akil, supra note 99, at 63; Hermán Reyes, The Worst 
Scars Are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 867 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 591, 616 (2007).  
107 Bennion, supra note 9, at 753. 
108 Id. (citing Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 39). 
109 Id.  
110 Metzner & Fellner, supra note 49, at 104.  
111 Id.  
112 Haney, Restricting Solitary Confinement, supra note 10, at 295 (citations omitted).  
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Dr. Hernán Reyes, a specialist on the medical effects of detention, describes 
solitary confinement as a method of torture that does not physically assault the body and 
yet “entail[s] severe psychological pain and suffering and profoundly disrupt[s] the 
senses and personality.”113 Psychological torture “should not be minimized under the 
pretext that pain and suffering must be physical in order to be real.”114 Indeed, prolonged 
solitary confinement “has been said to be the most difficult torment of all to 
withstand.”115 If solitary confinement wreaks such psychological havoc so as to 
potentially cause worse pain than physical abuse, prisoners already suffering from mental 
illness in isolation are at risk of even more serious harm. 
Neurobiological studies show that the physical and psychological effects of 
solitary are intimately interconnected in ways that make a bright line distinction between 
the two inappropriate. Two prominent professors and researchers in the field, Jules Lobel 
and Huda Akil, write that “[n]euroscience at least muddies the distinction between bodily 
injury and mental harm, and, in the future, it might negate it entirely.”116 In making this 
assessment, Lobel and Akil discuss brain imaging and how emotional pain, such as 
chronic anxiety and depression, can actually alter the brain structure and function.117 For 
those who are isolated for lengthy periods of time, especially those with pre-existing 
mental illness, the effects may be permanent.118 For example, Akil’s work suggests that 
solitary confinement can “fundamentally alter the structure of the human brain in 
profound and permanent ways.”119 She argues that one region of the brain that is 
particularly susceptible to “fundamentally alter” is the hippocampus, which plays a major 
role in memory and stress, and physically shrinks under “severe and sustained stress.”120 
Notably, this physical damage can lead to mental harms, including “loss of emotional and 
stress control, loss of stress regulation, . . . defects in memory, spatial orientation, and 
other cognitive processes,” and, potentially, “lasting changes in mood, including severe 
depression.”121 This work demonstrates that there is “clear biological evidence of the 
overlap between physical and mental distress,” and supports the basic point that the line 
between the two is blurry at best.122  
Other laboratory studies have focused on the physiological effects of social 
isolation on prisoners’ cortisol levels, which directly correlate to serious physiological 
and psychological consequences.123 Cortisol, the “stress hormone,” is a regulatory 
hormone that is released when the body is under stress, including stress as a result of 
                                                 
113 Reyes, supra note 106, at 591.  
114 Id. at 615. 
115 Id. at 607. 
116 Lobel & Akil, supra note 99, at 63.  
117 Id. at 64. See also, text accompanying supra notes 102–105. 
118 Hafemeister & George, supra note 25, at 41–44. 
119 Lobel & Akil, supra note 99, at 69 (citation omitted). 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 69–70. 
122 Id. at 64. 
123 Nina Grant et al., Social Isolation and Stress-Related Cardiovascular, Lipid, and Cortisol Responses, 37 
ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 29, 29 (2009). 
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isolation.124 Social isolation is associated with an overall elevated cortisol profile, which 
has also been linked to general stress, neuroticism, and depression.125 Furthermore, high 
levels of isolation are associated with negative cardiovascular, metabolic, and 
neuroendocrine processes.126 Studies suggest that high levels of cortisol can increase 
blood cholesterol, triglycerides, and blood pressure, which are common risk factors for 
heart disease.127 Chronic elevated cortisol also increases the risk for depression, mental 
illness, and lower life expectancy.128 Elevated cortisol levels cause systemic 
inflammation, which wreaks havoc on the mind and body.129 When it comes to the 
physiological response to extreme isolation of increased cortisol, it is simply impossible 
to determine where the line should be drawn between physical and psychological harm. 
They are deeply connected. 
The harms solitary confinement has on human minds and bodies are many and 
complex. The psychological horrors suffered by people in extreme isolation are no less 
worthy of reprieve than serious physical harm and are often inextricably connected so as 
to make a distinction unwarranted. However, as Part IV demonstrates, there exist 
substantial barriers which make it incredibly difficult for prisoners in solitary 
confinement suffering from mental illness to bring successful conditions of confinement 
claims.   
IV. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES: WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
The idea that physical harm is somehow worse than psychological harm has 
created substantial barriers to mentally ill prisoners seeking relief from their own 
personal hell. First, courts have been “more reluctant to find [Eighth Amendment] 
constitutional violations in the psychological conditions of solitary confinement rather 
than in the physical conditions.”130 Additionally, various provisions of the PLRA serve as 
a reminder that mental injury is not as worthy of reprieve as physical injury. The physical 
injury requirement limits prisoner litigants’ ability to recover compensatory damages for 
claims alleging only mental harm. Moreover, the PLRA’s distinction between physical 
and psychological harm makes it extremely difficult for indigent litigants with three 
strikes to bring a successful challenge because, as a threshold matter, they must prove 
they are in imminent danger of serious bodily (i.e., physical harm). However, in a world 
where physical and psychological harm were instead treated as similarly serious, these 
barriers would not exist.  
                                                 
124 Christopher Bergland, Cortisol: Why the “Stress Hormone” Is Public Enemy No. 1, PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY (Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-athletes-way/201301/cortisol-why-the-
stress-hormone-is-public-enemy-no-1. 
125 Grant et al., supra note 123, at 35. 
126 Id. at 36. 
127 Stress Can Increase Your Risk for Heart Disease, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER MED. CTR., 
https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?ContentTypeID=1&ContentID=2171 (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2018).  
128 Bergland, supra note 124. 
129 CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., How Stress Influences Disease: Study Reveals Inflammation as the Culprit, 
SCIENCEDAILY (Apr. 2, 2012), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/04/120402162546.htm. 
130 Rebman, supra note 87, at 607 n.359. 
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A. The Eighth Amendment Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”131 If prolonged 
solitary confinement is truly as awful as everyone, even correctional professionals,132 
says it is for prisoners suffering from mental illness, then it is a per se violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. Indeed, a handful of courts have recognized that placing seriously 
mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement risks causing mental pain that might rise to 
the level of cruel and unusual punishment.133 Regardless, “courts, prison officials, and 
legislators have been unwilling to recognize . . .  significant risk of mental pain and 
illness as constituting an Eighth Amendment Violation.”134 
To win an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must establish both an objective 
component—the seriousness of the challenged conditions—and a subjective 
component—the mental state of the officials who are responsible for the conditions.135 
There has been no shortage of Eighth Amendment challenges to solitary confinement.136 
However, they have rarely succeeded.137 Lower courts have occasionally recognized 
grave mental harm in the conditions of confinement context,138 but the Supreme Court 
has never done so.139 Courts have instead focused on duration and the physical conditions 
                                                 
131 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
132 See ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 47, at 145, 154, 155; Raemisch, supra note 75. 
133 See, e.g., Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 957 (7th Cir. 2017); supra notes 69–74.  
134 Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 133 
(2008). 
135 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
136 A cursory search for cases in Westlaw involving Eighth Amendment challenges to solitary confinement 
returned over 6,000 federal cases. 
137 See e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (suggesting that the Eighth Amendment is only 
concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable 
for prison confinement”); Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“While, as a personal matter, 
we . . . find the length of [plaintiff’s] confinement [10 years] greatly disturbing . . . we agree that under the 
law as it currently stands, [plaintiff] has not made out an Eighth Amendment violation.”); Johnson v. Doe, 
582 F. App’x 512, 513 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a prisoner with serious mental illness failed to meet the 
“extremely high” deliberate indifference standard); Pettigrew v. Zavaras, 574 F. App’x 801, 809 (10th Cir. 
2014) (recognizing the possibility that a mentally ill prisoner challenging his segregation stated a 
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, but declining to reach the issue and instead affirming the district 
court’s dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity); Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 
2008) (holding that allegations of confinement in administrative segregation for “three years and running” 
failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim). 
138 See Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding psychological harm 
actionable under Eighth Amendment); Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[E]xtreme 
conduct by custodians that causes severe emotional distress is sufficient.”); Scher v. Engelke, 943 F.2d 921, 
924 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that “the scope of the eighth amendment protection is broader than the mere 
infliction of physical pain,” and that evidence of “fear, mental anguish and misery” can establish the 
requisite injury for an Eighth Amendment claim). 
139 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that he “[did] not 
read anything in the Court’s opinion to limit injury cognizable under the Eighth Amendment to physical 
injury,” and that “[i]t is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm—without corresponding 
physical harm—that might prove to be cruel and unusual”). 
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of solitary confinement.140 As such, Eighth Amendment claims generally have 
“succeeded only when a prisoner alleged a concurrent deprivation of a physical need.”141 
The way courts treat psychological harm varies, but generally courts are more 
reluctant to find constitutional violations in psychological conditions of solitary 
confinement than in physical conditions.142 Even courts that have recognized the problem 
with psychological harm seem to be more comfortable focusing on physical rather than 
psychological pain.143 Physical conditions are visible, and more apparent to prison 
officials, while psychological conditions are typically hidden in the minds of the 
prisoners and are incapable of diagnosis by untrained observers. One scholar argues that 
the reason for the lack of recognition of psychological pain is the “discounting of mental 
pain in the United States’ approach to cruel and inhuman treatment,” as evidenced by the 
PLRA provision denying damages for mental or emotional injury without a showing of 
physical injury.144 Although courts have recognized that psychological harm can 
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment,145 the failure to treat mental pain as 
seriously as physical pain has limited such claims. Furthermore, Eighth Amendment 
claims centering around psychological pain are often seen as feigned or exaggerated,146 
so they are sometimes “limited or denied in the absence of observable physical injury.”147 
Any legal claim to categorically prohibit the placement of prisoners with mental 
illness in solitary confinement must be based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment. It 
must allege that, taken together, the risks to mental and physical health from placement in 
isolated confinement pose a substantial and unreasonable risk of serious harm.148 While 
there are a handful of lower courts that have found mental harm to be sufficiently serious 
in mentally ill prisoners to make a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, the reluctance of 
                                                 
140 See e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (considering both “degree of restriction” imposed 
by particular solitary-confinement regime and its duration before concluding that plaintiff did not suffer an 
“atypical, significant deprivation”). 
141 Note, The Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American Prisons, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1250, 1261 (2015). 
142 See Rebman, supra note 87, at 607 n.358 (comparing the way that courts generally treat physical 
conditions to the way that courts treat psychological conditions in the context of Eighth Amendment 
claims). 
143 See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364–65 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “[w]hile the prison 
administration may punish [inmates], it may not do so in a manner that threatens the physical and mental 
health of prisoners” and finding that placing a prisoner in a “dry cell” where he was refused access to 
adequate sanitation was cruel and unusual; however, the analysis focused much more on the physical 
conditions than on whether the conditions jeopardized the mental health of inmates in those conditions).  
144 Lobel, supra note 134, at 133.  
145 Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that strip search of male prisoners in 
front of female guards made an Eighth Amendment claim if the search was “conducted in a harassing 
manner intended to humiliate and inflict psychological pain”); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 273 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Constitution does not countenance psychological torture merely because it fails to inflict 
physical injury.”); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that “significant . . . 
emotional injury” can constitute Eighth Amendment pain).  
146 See supra Part II(B)(1) (discussing the tendency of prison officials to label prisoners as malingering).  
147 Lobel, supra note 134, at 133 n.78. 
148 Conditions of confinement are “a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment . 
. . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)). 
To prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim, there must be a “substantial risk of serious harm” to 
which prison officials were deliberately indifferent. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–36 (1994).   
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courts to treat psychological harm the same as physical harm has led to limited success in 
ensuring that prisoners suffering from mental illness are not subjected to extreme 
isolation for prolonged periods of time. 
Recognizing that the physical and psychological harm prisoners with mental 
illness experience are not readily separable, and instead placing the harm on same level 
of severity, would make such a claim under the Eighth Amendment easier to make—in 
other words, the inquiry of whether the alleged ailment is sufficiently serious to warrant a 
constitutional concern would be an easier question to answer if mental harm (short of 
suicide and self-mutilation) was automatically considered serious. Courts and the 
legislature alike should defer to the scientific community, which is in overwhelming 
agreement that the physical and psychological effects of solitary confinement on 
prisoners with mental illness are devastating. 
B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a 1996 federal statute, has made it 
more difficult for prisoners to pursue legal claims in federal court and get meaningful 
redress. First, § 1915(g), the three-strikes provision, forbids prisoners who have 
accumulated three-strikes during previous litigation efforts from proceeding in forma 
pauparis unless they are in imminent danger of serious bodily harm.149 Additionally, § 
1997e(e), the physical injury requirement, limits the ability of prisoners alleging mental 
injury to get meaningful redress by removing the possibility to recover compensatory 
damages.150 Both sections perpetuate the misconception that physical harm is more 
serious and worthier of redress than mental harm.  
1. Three Strikes Litigation 
Recognizing that psychological harm can be just as serious, if not more serious 
than physical harm would help protect some of the most vulnerable prisoners in solitary 
confinement: those who have “three strikes.” Under the § 1915(g) of the PLRA, prisoners 
may not proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) if the prisoner has brought three or more actions 
or appeals that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim, “unless 
the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”151 This constraint puts 
many prisoners with mental illness who are confined to prolonged and extreme isolation 
in a difficult position. 
The federal IFP statute authorizes a waiver of up-front filing fees for bringing an 
action or appeal in federal court.152 The ability to proceed IFP is critical for prisoners 
                                                 
149 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). 
150 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012). 
151 § 1915(g). 
152 See § 1915(a)(1) (“Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may authorize the 
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal 
therein, without prepayment of fees or security thereof, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a 
statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security 
therefor.”). 
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attempting to bring civil claims.153 The filing fee for a civil action in a federal appellate 
court is $505, while in district court it is $400.154 The three strikes provision forces some 
prisoners to pay the filing fee upfront, which most prisoners cannot afford. If a prisoner 
with three strikes does not have the money to pay upfront, the prisoner must prove that he 
or she is in “imminent danger serious physical injury.”155 The legislature, by drawing a 
bright line between physical and psychological harm when it enacted the PLRA, has 
compounded the problem for prisoners held in solitary confinement and created an almost 
insurmountable barrier for prisoners with mental illnesses. 
Furthermore, it is quite easy for prisoners to rack up three strikes, especially 
considering the relevant population: mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement as 
discussed in Part I. Defining a strike as any claim that is frivolous, malicious, or 
dismissed for failure to state a claim created a large net, capturing a wide range of 
claims.156 There is also a lack of clarity in what constitutes such a claim. For example, 
courts have found that claims of small monetary value may be frivolous.157 In Nagy v. 
FMC Butner, the Fourth Circuit upheld a lower court’s dismissal of a claim for $25 for a 
lost coat as frivolous.158 While $25 for a coat may seem trivial to someone outside of a 
prison context, to someone with very few personal possessions, a $25 coat may have 
increased importance and significance. In another example, a complaint that repeated 
allegations of a previous litigation was deemed abusive and malicious.159 
Prisoners with mental illness in solitary confinement are also particularly 
vulnerable to making mistakes that cause them to rack up strikes. First, solitary 
confinement limits prisoners access to legal resources, making it substantially more 
difficult for such prisoners to bring actions that successfully state a claim, even where 
there is an objectively cognizable claim.160 Moreover, given the impacts of solitary 
                                                 
153 In practice, most civil litigation by prisoners is civil rights litigation. Randal S. Jeffrey, Restricting 
Prisoners' Equal Access to the Federal Courts: The Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act and Substantive Equal Protection, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2001) (citing Eugene J. Kuzinski, 
Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 362 n.10 (1998)). 
154 Fee Schedule, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL., 
https://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/FilingCases.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2018). Although this site is for one 
U.S. district court and one federal court of appeals, the fees are the same across the country.  
155 § 1915(g). 
156 For example, one court dismissed on appeal a prisoner’s claim that his eight-day placement in solitary 
confinement arose to a liberty interest subject to due process. Two strikes were assessed against the 
prisoner—one for the dismissal on appeal, and one for the dismissal below. Dehghani v. Vogelgesang, 229 
F. App’x 282, 284 (5th Cir. 2007). In an immigrant detainee’s suit over conditions of confinement, the 
court dismissed the claims of loud noise, constant light, noxious smells, and low room temperature as 
frivolous. Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (E.D. Va. 1999). The plaintiff’s complaint for failure to 
protect from assault was also deemed frivolous. Id.  
157 Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2004). 
158 Id.  
159 Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F. Supp. 627, 629 (N.D. Ind. 1983); see also Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 
1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A]n IFP complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims 
may be considered abusive and dismissed . . . .”). 
160 Prisoners in solitary confinement have few privileges, including restricted or prohibited access to 
general prison library services. Solitary Confinement: Fact Sheet, JOHN HOWARD SOC’Y OF ONT. (Feb. 3, 
2017), http://johnhoward.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Solitary-Confinement-FactSheet-Final.pdf.    
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confinement on cognitive functions discussed earlier,161 coupled with a pre-existing 
mental illness, it should come as no surprise that prisoners rack up strikes, especially 
given the fact that courts will find repetitive litigation to be malicious, and “trivial” 
litigation to be frivolous.162 By applying the three strikes provision to prisoners who seek 
to bring civil rights actions and appeals, but who are unable to afford the filing fees, the 
provision effectively denies such persons access to the courts. 
2. The Exception to the Three Strikes Provision  
Although there is an exception to the three strikes provision for prisoners that are 
in imminent danger of serious physical injury, courts are divided on what satisfies the 
imminent danger of serious physical injury requirement, especially when it comes to 
psychological harm. Some courts emphasize the difference between psychological and 
physical injury and find that psychological harm “does not satisfy the requirement that [a 
prisoner] be in ‘imminent danger of serious physical harm.’”163 In Watley v. Collins, the 
court held that the plaintiff failed to meet the imminent danger standard despite his 
allegations that he was mentally ill and had been placed in supermax conditions as a 
result of his misbehavior, which aggravated his mental illness and therefore his 
misbehavior.164 The prisoner had attempted suicide, was maced, and engaged in behavior 
that disturbed other prisoners, who then threw urine and feces at him.165 In Darvie v. 
Countryman, the court characterized “anxiety, depression, stress, nausea, 
hyperventilation, headaches, insomnia, dizziness, appetite loss, weight loss, etc.” as 
“essentially emotional in nature” and not satisfying the physical harm requirement.166 
Many courts find that even the risk of self-harm as the result of mental illness 
does not satisfy the physical injury or imminent danger standard. In such cases, the courts 
express concern that prisoners will try to escape the three strikes provision of the PLRA 
by inflicting “imminent danger” on him or herself,167 supporting the proposition that 
prisoners are often seen as feigning mental health issues in a prison context.168 
                                                 
161 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
162 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1087 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
163 Bryan v. McCall, No. 5:15-871, 2016 WL 529574, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(g) (2012)).  
164 No. 1:06-cv-794, 2006 WL 3422996, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006). 
165 Id.  
166 No. 9:08-CV-0715, 2008 WL 2725071, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008). 
167 See Pinson v. Pledger, No. CIV-15-319-F, 2016 WL 4534925, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 22) (collecting 
cases), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Pinson v. FNU Pledger, No. CIV-15-0319-F, 2016 
WL 4535044 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 30), appeal dismissed, Pinson v. Pledger, No. 16-6272, 2016 WL 9665172 
(10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016); Widmer v. Butler, No. 14-cv-874-NJR, 2014 WL 3932519, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 
12, 2014) (holding that prisoner may not escape the three-strikes provision of the PLRA by inflicting 
“imminent danger” upon himself); Pauline v. Mishner, No. 09-00182, 2009 WL 1505672, at *2 (D. Haw. 
May 28, 2009) (“Although Plaintiff states that he has harmed himself again, may be suicidal, and may harm 
others, Plaintiff has not shown that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury when he filed this 
complaint.”); Cooper v. Bush, No. 3:06-cv-653-J-32TEM, 2006 WL 2054090, at *1 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 21, 
2006) (holding that plaintiff's allegations that he will commit suicide, or that he has already attempted 
suicide and will do so again, are insufficient to show imminent danger); Wallace v. Cockrell, No. 03-MC-
 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY                 [2019      
 
 288 
Courts are reluctant to hold that pure “mental harm” can, on its own, satisfy the 
requirement of § 1915(g).169 However, some courts have found that self-harm can satisfy 
the injury requirement.170 The Seventh Circuit has been receptive to the idea that 
exacerbation of mental illness leading to a high chance of self-harm or suicide can satisfy 
the imminent danger of serious bodily injury requirement for a three-strikes prisoner.171 
In July 2018, the court found that a mentally ill prisoner raised a “genuine concern that 
the negative psychological effects of his segregation will drive him to self-harm. So 
[Plaintiff] ha[d] plausibly alleged that his continued segregation place[d] him in 
imminent danger of serious bodily injury.”172 
While the Seventh Circuit’s more progressive view of what can satisfy §1915(g) 
is an important step, it still draws a sharp line between psychological and physiological 
harm, cementing the view that “mental anguish is not a serious physical injury.”173 
Finding that only mentally ill prisoners who are in imminent danger of self-harming or 
committing suicide satisfy § 1915(g) still promulgates the idea that physical harm or pain 
is somehow worse than psychological pain. This represents a failure among courts, even 
those most receptive to mentally ill prisoners’ challenges to solitary, to contend with the 
fact that mental injury or pain can be just as debilitating and serious as physical injury or 
pain, even absent suicidal actions. 
3. The Physical Injury Requirement 
Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA states that “[n]o Federal civil action may be 
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental 
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical 
injury.”174 The physical injury requirement has been cabined by courts so that lawsuits 
for injunctive and declaratory relief remain available to prisoner litigants alleging mental 
injury.175 Additionally, punitive and nominal damages generally remain available.176 
However, such damages are often ineffective at redressing the harm prisoners with 
mental illness in solitary face. First, courts have not reached a consensus over whether a 
                                                                                                                                                 
98-K, 2003 WL 22961212, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2003) (holding that a prisoner’s claim that he was 
suicidal “cannot create the imminent danger so as to escape the three strikes provision of the PLRA”). 
168 See supra Part II(B)(1) (discussing the tendency of prison officials to label prisoners as malingering or 
feigning).  
169 See Dye v. Bartow, No. 06-C-0634, 2007 WL 1168771, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 17, 2007) (opining that 
“the plaintiff may be in imminent danger of serious mental harm . . . [and] plaintiff will be permitted to 
proceed in forma pauperis in this action” only after discussing the physically life-threatening side effects of 
his mental illness, including dehydration and weight loss). 
170 See Settle v. Phillips, No. 3:16-CV-250-RLJ-CCS, 2016 WL 3080810, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. May 31, 2016) 
(prisoner with significant mental-health problems who alleged that his seventeen years in solitary 
confinement placed him at risk of serious physical injury to himself was deemed to be in imminent danger 
so as to satisfy § 1915(g)).    
171 Wallace v. Baldwin, 895 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2018); Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 
2017); Gilbert-Mitchell v. Lappin, No. 06-741-MJR, 2008 WL 4545343, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2008). 
172 Wallace, 895 F.3d at 485 (citing Sanders, 873 F.3d at 960).  
173 Thompson v. Patterson, No. 12-0086-KD-M, 2012 WL 3257802, at *3 (S.D. Ala. July 11, 2012). 
174 42 U.S.C. § 1997(c) (2012). 
175 Note, Developments in the Law of Mental Illness (pt. 1), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1151 (2008). 
176 Id.  
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prisoner must actually plead nominal damages.177 Additionally, nominal damages rarely 
exceed one dollar.178 As for punitive damages, though a majority of circuit courts permit 
the recovery in the absence of compensatory damages, some do not.179 Further, punitive 
damages are never awarded as a matter of right, no matter how egregious the situation.180 
Even in circuit courts that allow for punitive damages, the bar to recovery is nearly 
insurmountable: a prisoner must prove that a defendant acted with malicious intent or 
reckless indifference.181  
In sum, compensatory damages are the most important backward-looking remedy, 
and prisoners alleging only mental injury are barred from recovering them.182 Because 
the PLRA also severely limits the amount attorneys can recover in fee awards,183 the bar 
on compensatory damages reduces the incentives for attorneys to take these cases, 
creating yet another barrier to successful litigation. In denying compensatory damages for 
mental or emotional harm, the PLRA physical injury requirement delivers a strong 
message: mental pain is not as worthy of reprieve as physical harm. 
C. No Relief for Prisoners in Solitary Confinement Suffering from Mental Illness 
While a few states and some judges have acknowledged the horrors that prisoners 
suffering from mental illness face in solitary confinement, the vast majority of prisoners 
are denied relief. 
In February of 2016, the Indiana Department of Corrections reached a settlement 
in a case brought by the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana and the Indiana 
Protection and Advocacy Services Commission on behalf of prisoners in solitary 
confinement.184 The settlement prohibits, with some exceptions, the placement of 
individuals with serious mental illness in solitary confinement.185 While these changes 
                                                 
177 Alison Cohn, Comment, Can $1 Buy Constitutionality?: The Effect of Nominal and Punitive Damages 
on the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 299, 309 (2006). 
178 James Pfander, A Nominal Solution to Qualified Immunity, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1602, 1610 n.40 (2011). 
179 See Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 1999); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 
1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
180 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51–52 (1983). 
181 Id. at 56. 
182 While circuit courts are split as to whether Congress intended § 1997e(e) to apply to constitutional 
claims, which presumably would encompass the Eighth Amendment, the analysis is generally in regard to 
First Amendment violations. Compare Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that § 1997e(e) extends to First Amendment claims), Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374–75 (5th Cir. 
2005), Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004), Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 875–76 
(10th Cir. 2001), Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2000), with Wilcox v. Brown, 877 
F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that prisoners may seek compensatory damages when prison 
officials violate their First Amendment rights), Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2016), King v. 
Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015), Toliver v. City of New York, 530 F. App’x 90, 93 n.2 (2d Cir. 
2013), Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999), Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
182 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). 
183 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012).  
184 Jack Denton, Settlement Limits Solitary Confinement for People with Mental Illness in Indiana’s 
Prisons, SOLITARY WATCH (Feb. 11, 2016), http://solitarywatch.com/2016/02/11/settlement-limits-solitary-
confinement-for-people-with-mental-illness-in-indianas-prisons/. 
185 Id.  
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match what a few other states have done,186 “declining to torture the mentally ill is a low 
bar.”187 Other states, including Colorado, Massachusetts, and New York also have passed 
legislation that bans the placement of people with serious mental illness in solitary 
confinement.188 In addition to state-wide initiatives, there is some case law suggesting 
that solitary confinement might be inappropriate for people with mental illness.189 
Settlement agreements, legislative initiatives, and litigation efforts do not 
necessarily mean change is imminent for mentally ill prisoners. In Alabama, despite a 
court directive issued in June 2017 to remove prisoners with serious mental illness from 
solitary confinement absent extenuating circumstances,190 two random inspections in 
December 2017 and January 2018 revealed 152 prisoners with a “serious mental illness” 
in such conditions.191 In Colorado, a 2014 law prohibits placing people with serious 
mental illness in solitary cells.192 However, in 2016, a state auditor found 45 of the 326 
people in shorter-term disciplinary segregation had serious mental illness.193 The report 
revealed that the department did not test whether people had mental illness before 
isolating them, so the actual number of people with mental illness in isolation was likely 
higher than what the report suggested.194 Additionally, following the 2016 report, over 
about a six-month period, three prisoners in Colorado with serious mental illness ended 
up in long-term solitary.195 Six inmates were not removed from solitary within thirty days 
after staff discovered they suffered from mental illness, and thirty-six were held in 
disciplinary segregation for over two months.196 
Not a single legal or advocacy effort has led to the conclusion that the placement 
of prisoners suffering from mental illness in prolonged solitary confinement is a per se 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. This leaves the door open for exceptions, which is 
unacceptable given the overwhelming scientific consensus of what inevitably happens to 
people with mental illness in solitary confinement. Furthermore, these state-wide 
initiatives, settlement agreements, and cases impact just a fraction of the mentally ill 
prisoners trapped in solitary. 
                                                 
186 Arizona, California, Illinois, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have reached agreements promising to reduce 
the number of prisoners with mental illness in solitary confinement. Id.    
187 Editorial Bd., Indiana Takes a Step Forward on Solitary Confinement, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/indianas-step-forward-on-solitary-
confinement/2016/01/28/9838e184-bfc2-11e5-83d4-42e3bceea902_story.html?utm_term=.58d75f6dcb05.  
188 Denton, supra note 184.  
189 See, e.g., supra notes 69–74. 
190 See Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1247 (M.D. Ala. 2017).  
191 Despite Court Directive, Alabama Still Segregates Seriously Mentally Ill Prisoners, S. POVERTY L. CTR. 
(Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2018/02/08/despite-court-directive-alabama-still-
segregates-seriously-mentally-ill-prisoners.  
192 Andrew Kenney, Auditor: Colorado Prisons Have Sharply Reduced Their Use of Solitary Confinement, 
but There Are Still Some Serious Issues, DENVERITE (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.denverite.com/auditor-
colorado-prisons-sharply-reduced-use-solitary-confinement-still-serious-issues-24380/.  
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
195 Id.  
196 Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
Being human is relational, plain and simple. We exist in relationship to 
one another, to ideas, and to the world. It’s the most essential thing about 
us as a species: how we realize our potential as individuals and create 
meaningful lives. Without that, we shrink. Day by day, we slowly die.197 
 
For the tens of thousands of mentally ill prisoners currently deteriorating in 
solitary confinement, the line between physical and psychological harm is a significant 
obstacle between them and reprieve from the torture of solitary confinement. The effects 
of solitary confinement, both physically and psychologically, on prisoners with mental 
illness are well known, not just in the medical and scientific communities, but in the 
corrections community at large. Their brains literally shrink in size. They mutilate their 
bodies. They die.  
Given the overwhelming research suggesting that psychological harm can be just 
as, if not more, debilitating than physical harm, placing a mentally ill person in solitary 
confinement should be a per se constitutional violation. Courts recognizing that placing 
mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment would have 
profound consequences. I do not trivialize the burden such a finding would have on the 
prison system in the United States. Prisons would have an affirmative duty to perform 
diligent mental health evaluations on every single prisoner before placing him or her in 
solitary confinement. Furthermore, because it is well known that solitary confinement can 
bring out mental health issues in prisoners, these mental health evaluations would need to 
be conducted at frequent intervals. However, this seems to be a small price to pay to 
prevent the incredible harm that such prisoners are sure to face when thrown in the 
“hole”.  
While a finding that solitary confinement is categorically inappropriate for 
prisoners with mental illness would be preferable, at minimum courts should begin to 
treat serious psychological harm with the same level of severity as physical harm so as to 
remove some of the barriers prisoners with mental illness currently face in bringing 
successful challenges to their placement in solitary confinement. By recognizing that the 
line between serious physical and serious psychological harm is blurry, courts could stop 
making determinations they are simply not qualified to make. It is not only cruel, but 
objectively dangerous, to prevent prisoners with mental illness from bringing a claim to 
court to seek treatment or other help to reduce the effects of their illness, such as a 
reprieve from extreme isolation. Removing the bright line courts have drawn between 
physical and psychological harm would impact the ability of mentally ill prisoners to 
bring civil rights claims challenging their extreme isolation, regardless of whether they 
have accumulated three strikes, and regardless of whether their mental suffering is 
accompanied a traditionally physical injury. 
Prisons have unwillingly become mental health centers. More mentally ill people 
are housed in prisons and jails than in actual mental health facilities.198 Perhaps a finding 
that those suffering from mental illness do not belong in extreme isolation or a court 
                                                 
197 HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE, supra note 32, at xii. 
198 See generally TORREY ET AL., supra note 42.  
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system that effectively evaluates extreme psychological harm to those same prisoners 
placed in solitary confinement would provide an impetus for Congress to take a harder 
look at the mental health crisis in our country and invest in strong mental health systems 
outside of prisons and jails. 
As a country we can, and indeed we must, do better. Regardless of whether 
mentally ill prisoners trapped in steel boxes are seriously suffering physically, 
psychologically, or both, “evolving standards of [human] decency”199 should tell us that 
such suffering is unacceptable. 
                                                 
199 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). 
